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Utopian Justice: A Review of Global Justice,
A Cosmopolitan Account by Gillian Brock
KATELYN MINER*
In Global Justice, A Cosmopolitan Account, Gillian Brock, an
associate professor of philosophy at the University of Auckland in New
Zealand, posits a compelling argument in favor of global justice.
Through her theoretical framework and practical examples, Brock
asserts that she has "develop[ed] a viable cosmopolitan model of global
justice that takes seriously the equal moral worth of persons, yet leaves
scope for a defensible form of nationalism along with other legitimate
identifications and affiliations."' Brock's model of global justice is
grounded in moral cosmopolitan theory.2 She argues that as the world's
societies and cultures become more intertwined, typically through the
process of globalization, people must understand that each individual is
a "member of a global community of human beings" and, as such,
individuals owe certain obligations to all other members, even those
distant to them.3 According to Brock, moral cosmopolitanism breaks
down the barriers that restrict individuals from looking beyond their
local allegiances and forces them to acknowledge their responsibilities to
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Alfred Aman, Jr. for his help in selecting the subject of this review and
the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Board of Editors for their assistance in the
editing process.
1. GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT 4 (2009).
2. Brock's account of global justice is inspired by John Rawls' work, The Law of
Peoples, in which he identifies what foreign policy principles representatives of liberal
peoples would select if they were "subject to an appropriate veil of ignorance." Id. at 21.
However, Brock's normative thought experiment diverges from The Law of Peoples in that,
instead of using representatives, she randomly selects her delegates "for a range of
reasons having to do with the problematic nature of representation." Id. at 76 n.17.
Additionally, her set-up is different from the "typical Rawlsian story" with regard to the
motivation of the parties involved in the global conference. Id. at 76 n.16. Unlike the
representatives in Rawls' model, who are motivated by the interests of their people, in
Brock's model "[tihe motivation of the parties in the original position is ... a mix of self-
interest . . . and fairness." Id. While there are other aspects of Brock's model that differ
from Rawls', they are beyond the scope of this review. For a more detailed discussion, see
generally id. at 17-83.
3. Id. at 8.
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the welfare of the global community.4 Brock's central assertion is that as
members of the global community, we are responsible for ensuring that
"all [people] are adequately positioned to enjoy the prospects for a
decent life, such that they are enabled to meet their basic needs, their
basic liberties are protected, and there are fair terms of cooperation in
collective endeavours."5
Brock recognizes that this concept is susceptible to attack; therefore,
her book is structured in response to her most severe skeptics. She
identifies two skeptics worthy of addressing and responds to each of
their arguments in different parts of her book. The first skeptic, the
"nationalism skeptic," is notorious for "believ[ing] that cosmopolitanism
interferes illegitimately with the defensible scope of nationalism and
undermines . . . national self-determination."6 The second skeptic, "the
feasibility skeptic," argues that Brock's cosmopolitan model of global
justice is unlikely to succeed in practice. Brock responds to these
skeptics' concerns by providing the reader with what she believes to be
concrete and indisputable reasons why her theoretical framework of
global justice is both realistic and feasible in practice. She sets the stage
for this in part I of her book, where she defends her theoretical model of
global justice through theory. In part II, she shifts her focus away from
theory toward public policy. In this section, Brock responds indirectly to
the feasibility skeptic's concerns by addressing ways in which the world
can make progress toward accomplishing the goals of global justice. In
part III, she returns to the theoretical issues, responds to both of the
skeptics, and summarizes her argument.
In part I of her book, Brock addresses the theoretical framework of
her model of cosmopolitan global justice. She borrows Rawls' "veil of
ignorance" model and uses it to determine what individuals would agree
to be the fairest framework to govern the world's inhabitants.7 Brock
sets up her thought experiment by imagining a hypothetical global
conference where randomly selected delegates attend and debate over
the appropriate framework.8 The world in which this conference takes
place is what Brock labels the "ideal world," which she claims to be as
closely modeled after the real world as possible.9 She explains that the
hypothetical delegates are blind to their situation in the world; they live
4. Id. at 9.
5. Id. at 322.
6. Id. at 4.
7. Id. at 48-50.
8. Id. at 48-49.
9. Id. (organizing the world into various communities that reflect current political,
religious, national, cultural, or linguistic divisions and the self-interested quality of
individuals).
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"behind a veil of ignorance."' 0 It is her belief that "if people do not know
what positions they might find themselves in during the lottery of life,
they will pay more attention to what would constitute fair
arrangements."" She does this so that her delegates will be unable to
predict with any amount of certainty where they could be positioned in
the world as a means to avoid partiality. However, Brock does provide
the delegates with some information that she deems indispensible for
purposes of determining what would be the most just system for
interactions and relations among members of the global community.
The delegates know "the data about our urgent global collective
problems," including the severe threats to security and peace, terrorist
activities, drug cartels, environmental concerns, and health risks. 12
According to Brock, these hypothetical delegates are more likely to
honestly and seriously consider what they would be willing to tolerate in
their world given that they do not know what their life situation will be.
She claims that as a result, delegates would agree on a framework that
ensures each person would, at a minimum, enjoy prospects for a decent
life. She claims that this agreement would consist of two central
claims-that all individuals would enjoy some basic freedoms and that
all people would be protected from serious harm.13 She argues that the
delegates would likely agree that a world government would be a less
desirable form of governance and that some form of mixed governance
among the states would be a more prudent choice for achieving these
goals.' 4 Brock reiterates that, in the end, "whatever governing
structures [the delegates] endorse would (at a minimum) have as the
central part of their mandate to ensure that people are so positioned
that meeting their basic needs is within their reach, and that their basic
liberties are protected." 15 Brock acknowledges that this model, grounded
in a needs-based minimum floor principle, is vulnerable to attack due to
10. Id. at 49 (explaining that they "do not know where they live, the territory's size,
how numerous or powerful the people are, what level of economic development is
dominant in that territory, [or] how well endowed it is with natural resources").
11. Id. at 48.
12. Id. at 49.
13. Id. at 50.
14. See id. at 52-53. Brock explains that delegates might agree on a mixed form of
governance that retains state authority over some matters (such as "people's abilities to
meet their needs and protect their freedoms"), but also allows for joint sovereignty "where
protection of vital interests can be secured only if there is widespread cooperation across
states." Id. She discusses how delegates might find it prudent to choose this form of
governance because of the significance of their decision. She offers the reader two reasons
why this is so: (1) it would be a more risk-adverse and cautious approach; and (2) "there is
a legitimate concern about what might transpire if world government turns out to be very
bad." Id. at 53.
15. Id. at 53.
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its merely theoretical basis 16 (especially from those cosmopolitans who
might select a model grounded in a "difference principle");17 however, to
rebut, she provides the reader with some convincing findings from
experimental psychology to support her position.' 8
At the end of part I, Brock tackles some of the concerns held by the
nationalism skeptic by addressing whether genuine international
democracy can be achieved.19 She discusses what "global governance"
structure would be most effective for realizing the goals of her global
justice model. Brock begins by listing nine reasons why global
governance is necessary in order to pursue global justice in an even-
handed manner. 20 It is important to note that Brock's definition of
global governance is not meant to be synonymous with the term "world
governance." In Brock's mind 'global governance' refers to how we
manage interests affecting residents of more than one state in the
absence of a world government (or centralized power . . . )."21 According
to Brock, the most effective form of global governance is a system based
on accountability and effectiveness. 22 She claims that a "responsive form
of democracy" is best because it will be better able to respond to people's
interests and more successful at securing those interests. 23
While up to this point Brock has focused primarily on ideal theory,
in part II, Brock shifts the reader's attention to the practical ways her
model can be realized. She turns her focus away from theory and moves
to issues of public policy in an attempt to show the reader how the world
can move closer toward realizing the goals of global justice. Brock's
overall goal in part II is to combat the arguments made by her
feasibility skeptic. She identifies a number of the skeptic's concerns
regarding the practicality and workability of her model of global justice.
She focuses on a number of public issues in the world that her model
16. Id. at 54.
17. Id.; see also id. at 46-47 (discussing the work of Darrel Moellendorf, which supports
the more traditional cosmopolitan proposition that representatives would choose a model
based on a "global difference principle").
18. See id. at 54-56. Brock cites a study by psychologists Norman Frohlich and Joe
Oppenheimer that suggests that "ordinary folk" would agree on some form of just
distribution. Their study indicated that in order to balance the needs, incentives, and
entitlements of individuals in a society, "the most just distribution of income [would be]
that which maximizes the average income only after a certain specified minimum income
is guaranteed to everyone." Id. at 55 (quoting NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER,
CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 201 (1992)).
19. Id. at 84-85.
20. Id. at 86-89 (providing examples such as, international economic interdependence,
global health problems, and uneven distribution of natural resources).
21. Id. at 84.
22. Id. at 104.
23. Id. at 105-09.
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can reform, such as global poverty, taxation reform, humanitarian
intervention, immigration, protecting basic liberties, as well as
problems involved with the global economy.24 Brock pays significant
attention to each of these issues in her book as a means of defending her
model against the feasibility skeptic, but for the sake of brevity, I will
focus on her use of two issues-global poverty and taxation.
At the beginning of the section on global poverty, Brock presents the
reader with compelling figures concerning the levels of poverty in the
world today. 25 It is Brock's position that impoverished countries remain
impoverished in part due to the inferior quality of institutions in those
countries. In essence, she argues that the governing bodies and
organizations in these nations cannot "manage conflict, maintain law
and order, enable society and political stability, and sustain its
regulatory capacity." 26 Brock claims that reforming international
institutions can have a dramatic effect on the quality of institutions in
these developing countries. 27 In this chapter, Brock concentrates on how
reforming the current practices that regulate world taxation can impact
global poverty. Her suggested reforms focus on restructuring our
current system of international taxation, specifically in a way that
makes transactions more transparent and participants more
accountable, which Brock believes will cause global poverty to diminish.
Brock provides the reader with a detailed look at some of the problems
developing countries face because large corporations are "effectively
escaping taxation" in these countries. 28
Brock claims that financial structures such as tax havens and
transfer pricing, coupled with the lack of requirements for trade
transparency and corporate accountability on an international level,
offer large corporations the opportunity to evade taxes. As a result of
these practices, developing nations lose revenue. This lost revenue could
provide the funds needed to create higher quality domestic institutions
that would provide citizens more opportunities for fulfilling their basic
24. Id. at 117.
25. Id. at 120. Approximately "25 per cent of the world's population subsists below the
international poverty line... . [A] sample of what we know about how well people are
currently able to meet their basic needs [includes]: 1.1 billion do not have access to safe
drinking water, 2.6 billion do not have basic sanitation, and 1 billion lack adequate
shelter. At least 850 million suffer from malnutrition and its effects. Diseases transmitted
through water or human waste are the second leading cause of death among children
worldwide, with 3,900 children dying every day from such diseases. An estimated 800
million adults are illiterate. Approximately 115 million children do not get the most basic
forms of education." Id.
26. Id. at 121.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 125.
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needs.29 Brock argues that the international trade industry needs more
regulation so that large corporations and wealthy individuals cannot
take advantage of people in these underdeveloped and politically
corrupt countries. In essence, the international community should
eliminate "tax havens, tax evasion, and transfer pricing schemes that do
not reflect 'arm's-length' pricing" in order to hold corporations
accountable for their practices and support democracy.30
Brock also supports the view that corporations should pay an
additional public goods tax.3' She contends that certain global public
goods, such as peace, social and political stability, and effective law
enforcement, facilitate trade, and because of this, those who participate
in global trade should pay for their enjoyment.32 She also argues for a
number of other global tax schemes, such as a carbon tax, a currency
tax, an e-mail tax, a tax on world trade, a tax on the international arms
trade, and aviation fuel taxes as means to aid developing nations.33
Of course, the next issue is how the global community would
coordinate, collect, and disperse the revenue raised by these tax
schemes in a way that would further the goals of global justice. Brock
envisions that nation-states would make agreements to formulate an
"internationally harmonized tax regime," and each nation would be
responsible for implementing specific global taxes through its regular
tax authority.34 "Each nation would [then] pass on an agreed amount or
percentage to an international organization for spending in line with the
specified global objectives."35 In effect, a new international organization
would need to be created to oversee this "global justice fund."3 6 Brock
argues that this is a feasible solution for combating global poverty and
that it does not require universal acceptance to be successful. 37
Throughout the rest of part II, Brock explores the other areas of the
global community that require public policy reform, focusing on how
reform in those areas can achieve the goals of her global justice model.
Brock's reforms often require the formation of a new international
organization or serious modifications to existing international
organizations. 38 However, current international bodies, such as the
29. Id. at 127.
30. Id. at 139.
31. Id. at 130.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 132-35.
34. Id. at 136.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., id. at 177 (Brock creates an international organization called the "Vital
Interests Protection Organization" that has the power to "authorize the use of force to
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United Nations and the United Nations Security Council, are
underfunded and function poorly as a means to protect all members of
the global community.3 9 It may be infeasible to create new international
organizations that will successfully combat issues such as global
poverty, tax evasion, and humanitarian intervention. This concern is.
not directly addressed in the book, but in part III, similar feasibility
skeptic arguments are contested.
In part III, Brock returns to her ideal theory and attempts to
dismantle the concerns of both of her skeptics. First, Brock addresses the
nationalism skeptic's concern that her model interferes with national
allegiance. She refutes this by explaining that her normative model
provides "adequate space for legitimate forms of nationalism or
patriotism."40 Brock accepts that many people have strong attachments to
their nations and "that these attachments can provide . . . significant
meaning in their lives."41 She explains that her main goal is to determine
what limits can be placed on these attachments so as to prevent partiality
from impeding the realization of the goals of her model. She contends that
her model allows more space for legitimate national aspirations, but that
as members of the global community, we owe all other members certain
obligations first. Specifically, she asserts that there are "morally salient
connections between 'us' in the developed world and 'them' in the
developing world" and, as a result, we owe these developing nations
certain obligations. 42 Due to a number of global practices that implicate
"us" in perpetuating the cycle of global poverty in these developing
nations, "we" owe "them."43 For example, she highlights how individuals
in developing nations do not have adequate health care resources due to
the current international health care worker recruitment practices of
developed nations. 44
By participating in activities that perpetuate the cycle of global
poverty, we are not ensuring that all people are adequately positioned to
enjoy the prospect of a decent life. As a result, these developed nations
owe certain external obligations to the global community. Those
restore or ensure that relevant vital interests are adequately protected" in all nations.
This new organization would also be resourced through taxes.); id. at 202 (arguing for the
creation of an international agency to oversee the fair recruitment of health care workers
from developing nations by developed nations).
39. Id. at 185.
40. Id. at 274.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 289.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 285 (addressing the devastating impact "brain drain" has on developing
nations when the majority of a nation's skilled citizens emigrate, leaving behind the less
skilled citizens).
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external obligations include ensuring that the appropriate international
institutions have been created and that those institutions are making
considerable progress toward ensuring that everyone's interests are
adequately protected in the world. Only after a nation has satisfied its
external obligations can it then "prioritize meeting the needs of [its]
compatriots."45 Here is where Brock claims that her model provides
room for legitimate national allegiance. She summarizes her argument
by stating that "[s]o long as individuals within the nation are
adequately respected and positioned to enjoy decent lives, and provided
that nations play their part in the collective project of ensuring a
globally just world, there is discretionary space for nations to pursue
national aspirations."46
At the end of part III, Brock addresses a number of concerns held by
the feasibility skeptic. Brock consolidates those concerns into four main
questions.4 7 She addresses the first three-(1) the goals of global justice,
(2) how to make progress toward those goals, and (3) how to track that
progress-by arguing that the goals of global justice can be realized
through institutional reforms and the creation of new international
organizations that will oversee and track its development. 48 In response
to the fourth question, which centers on how the global community will
be motivated to pursue the goals of global justice, Brock claims that all
nations have an interest in creating a global structure centered on
accountability that prevents corruption and abuse so as to ensure that
our "collective security can flourish."49 This interest will motivate
nations to support and become involved in institutional reforms that
will achieve the goals of global justice.50 Brock argues that some goals
can be achieved through reform of currently existing international
bodies, but this requires that large groups of people demand more
legitimacy from those institutions.5' Her method for motivating people
to demand reform includes altering school curricula in a manner that
heightens awareness of global problems and encouraging the formation
of a "world citizen" identity.52
45. Id. at 290.
46. Id. at 324.
47. Id. at 326 (summarizing the feasibility skeptic's concerns as "(A) Goals: What are
the goals of global justice?; (B) Transition: How can we make progress towards these?; (C)
Measurement: How can we track progress?; [and] (D) Motivation: How will we create the
motivation to pursue global justice or otherwise deal with the issue of global authority (or
lack thereof)?" (internal citations omitted)).
48. Id. at 326-29.
49. Id. at 329.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 332.
52. Id.
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Brock hoped to offer the reader "a vision of a realistic utopia ...
namely, as a normative account of what we can reasonably hope for in
justice at the global level, which takes people as they are now, is workable
and applicable to ongoing social and political arrangements, and .. . could
be realized in the near future."53 While her model for global justice is
compelling and well developed, there remain a number of practical issues
that need to be resolved. She addresses a number of notable concerns held
by her skeptics, but there are several important questions left
unanswered, for example: (1) Who will initiate and design the necessary
curriculum for the required educational reform?; (2) Who will provide the
resources and training for teachers?; (3) Who will provide the initial
startup capital to fund these global institutions that are meant to oversee
and promote global justice?; (4) Who will initiate their formation?; (5)
From where will these institutions operate?; and (6) How exactly will they
garner their authority? In other words, while Brock provides the reader
with more concrete suggestions for implementing her cosmopolitan model
of global justice, her theory is still rather more ideal than practical
reality. These unresolved issues make her model appear less realistic and
more utopian.
53. Id. at 40.

